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T he negotiating positions are less hard-line than might appear. It is quite possible for significant trade integration 
to remain between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union. The 
negotiating positions of the two involve 
a spectrum of alternatives which range 
from a very loose free trade agreement, 
on the one hand, to an ‘EEA-lite’, on the 
other, which secures full free movement 
of companies, goods, services and 
capital and significant liberalisation of 
free movement of persons.
The challenge is with this spectrum, 
however. Its breadth allows for very 
divergent negotiating positions. The 
United Kingdom might wish high levels 
of financial service integration, while 
the European Union might indicate 
that the price is a very liberal regime 
for movement of persons. Alternately, 
the price for protecting the position 
of the highly British pharmaceuticals 
industry  might  be set  as  g iv ing 
generous access to the British market 
for EU farmers. There are real issues of 
commensurability here. The domestic 
constituencies within both the European 
Union and the United Kingdom pushing 
for different measures will also be fluid, 
diverse and, most likely, rumbustious.
 
It is highly implausible, therefore, that 
the United Kingdom will secure a 
trade deal with the European Union 
before Brexit. This is all the more so 
because (a) the European Union will 
insist that the substance of the formal 
Article 50 TEU negotiations on things 
like residence rights of EU citizens 
and financial liabilities will need to be 
agreed before trade negotiations can 
get going (b) there is no reason for the 
European Union to rush negotiations as 
the United Kingdom suffers more from 
disorderly Brexit than it. It strengthens 
its negotiating position by dallying 
during 2017 and maybe early 2018, 
and (c) the mood music surrounding 
the negotiations is terrible. Negative 
and volatile press commentary may well 
constrain on what can be negotiated.
And if there is no deal? 
If there is no deal, relations between 
the European Union and the United 
Kingdom will be governed by WTO law. 
Each must offer the same terms to the 
other that it offers to all WTO States 
with whom it does not have a free trade 
or customs union agreement. United 
Kingdom exporters will be required 
to pay the same customs duties as 
United States’ exporters. Assessments 
as to whether these comply with EU 
regulations sufficiently to warrant 
market access will have to be on the 
same basis as assessments of US or 
Japanese exporters
This already binds the United Kingdom 
more than is realised. If negotiations go 
south with the European Union, it can 
punish the latter by imposing punitive 
tariffs on sensitive EU exports to the 
British market. However, if it does this, 
these tariffs will also have to be imposed 
on exports from Japan, Korea, the 
United States etc. And this would not be 
a promising start to the much vaunted 
trade negotiations with those States.
Furthermore, British business is used to 
a certain level of competition from non-
EU businesses on the British market. 
This has, hitherto, been determined by 
the levels of customs duties set by the 
European Union and the commercial 
policy instruments deployed by it (e.g. 
anti-dumping duties or countervailing 
measures). If British officials come in and 
remake the wheel by setting new duties 
or abolishing these instruments, this may 
well have unexpected and unwelcome 
effects on British jobs and businesses. 
It is more likely that the same levels of 
duty and identical instruments will be 
maintained, albeit with ‘Made in the 
United Kingdom’ label stuck over them.
Yet, how will WTO rules affect EU-UK 
trade from EU membership?
There is an assertion that it will hurt the 
European Union more than the United 
Kingdom as it runs a big trade surplus 
with the United Kingdom. However, 
things are a little more complicated than 
that. The European Union runs a huge 
trade surplus in goods with the United 
Kingdom whilst the United Kingdom 
runs a significant surplus in trade in 
services with the European Union. 
These surpluses fluctuate, but United 
Kingdom’s surplus in trade in services is 
generally about two thirds that of the 
European Union’s surplus in goods.
The sting in the tale is that WTO law 
requires considerable liberalisation in 
trade in goods but this is not the case 
with services. In other words, a good 
part of the European Union’s surplus 
might be protected but that might not 
be the case with the United Kingdom’s 
surplus in services.
Tariffs on most goods entering the EU 
are low and the growth of international 
standardisation, particularly since 2000, 
has meant that goods conforming 
with these standards experience few 
non-tariff barriers. The largest sectors 
where tariffs are high are automobiles 
and agriculture. In both these sectors, 
the United Kingdom imports more from 
the European Union than it exports. In 
addition, there are some sectors, such 
as automobiles and pharmaceuticals, 
where it is insufficient that the good 
comply with EU standards. The type 
Trade after Brexit
Leaving the European Union has been characterised as potentially 
one of the greatest protectionist acts in the United Kingdom’s 
history. The European Union has intimated that any trading 
relationship must offer the United Kingdom significantly worse 
terms of trade than it currently enjoys. Alongside this, the United 
Kingdom has no ambition to be either part of the customs union or 
the single market. This would put it on the periphery of European 
trade. Only a few States from the former Soviet Union would enjoy 
worse terms than it.
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of good must also have been tested for 
safety through authorised procedures (i.e. 
a new drug going through regulatory 
tests). British authorisation processes will 
not be recognised by the European Union 
after Brexit, and therefore may have to 
go through the EU’s own authorisation 
procedures.
In the field of services, there is only so-
called positive list liberalisation under 
WTO law. WTO members indicate the 
services sectors in which they wish to 
liberalise. In this regard, EU commitments 
in a number of services sectors, notably 
f inancial services, are extremely 
restricted with a requirement for many 
insurance and banking services being that 
they can only be offered by somebody 
established within the European Union. 
Even in so-called liberalised sectors, such 
as architecture or engineering, there 
may be further problems as the EU will 
no longer be committed to recognising 
British professional qualifications.
There is a further challenge. Much 
international trade today is made up 
of intra-industry value chains. Parts will 
come from States A, B and C, will be 
assembled in State D, and will supplied 
by capital from State E. Since 2000, there 
is evidence that the average number of 
parties in these networks have halved 
from about 15-20 to about 5-20 and they 
have become more regionally compact. 
The reason was that the chains were 
too unwieldy and were exposed to too 
much risk if something went wrong in 
one State or there was too much costs 
or hassle moving parts between States. 
The increased costs and complications of 
trade between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union post Brexit is likely 
to see some change in these chains. 
British producers more able to source 
supplies or services within the United 
Kingdom might turn to these rather 
than EU counterparts. The opposite will, 
of course, be true for EU producers. The 
party most likely to lose from this is the 
United Kingdom for the simple reason 
that it is a smaller and less diverse market 
than the European Union. EU producers 
will have alternatives if their value chain 
is disrupted, whereas British producers 
may not.
Trade with the rest of  
the world
But this will not matter, it is claimed, 
because Brexit al lows the United 
Kingdom to move around nimbly 
securing trade deals with the rest of the 
world so that it sits at the epicentre of 
world trade.
The reality is that the United Kingdom 
will lose access to many non-EU markets 
at the moment of Brexit. It will exit all 
the free trade arrangements that the 
European Union has made with non 
EU States. These markets will likely 
include, by 2019, Mexico, Turkey, 
Korea, Colombia, Ukraine, South Africa, 
Canada, Morocco and the EFTA States. 
Furthermore, no agreements with any 
EU State can be signed until after Brexit. 
Even if they are signed on the day after 
Brexit, some time will be needed for 
their ratification by national parliaments. 
There will, thus, be a period, therefore, 
when the UK is on the periphery of all 
major markets.
It would appear relatively easy for the 
United Kingdom to replicate the free 
trade agreements currently in force 
between the EU and non EU States. 
There is a template and both parties 
may have a strong interest in continuity. 
Even here, there may be glitches. There 
are some, notably those with Turkey, 
Norway and Iceland, which cannot be 
replicated because they involve too high 
a level of integration. If the UK does not 
want a customs union with the EU, it is 
unlikely to want one with Turkey, and 
it did not leave the EU single market to 
re-enter it through a single market with 
Norway and Iceland. There is also the 
possibility that non-EU States who felt 
that they were railroaded into less than 
optimal free trade arrangements with 
the EU because of its economic strength 
may wish to renegotiate when it comes 
to replicating these agreements with the 
United Kingdom.
Agreement is likely to be even more 
difficult with significant trading partners 
(i.e. United States, China, Japan, India 
and Mercosur) who do not currently 
have free trade arrangements with the 
European Union.
A central advantage of a free trade 
arrangement between, say, State A and 
B is that it grants goods from State B 
a competitive advantage over goods 
from State C on State A’s market, 
with the same being true for State A’s 
goods on the market of State of B. In 
determining what they will offer the 
United Kingdom, other States will wish 
to know the relative position of their 
industry and service providers vis-à-
vis their main foreign competitors on 
British markets, EU providers. The latter 
will often be their biggest competition, 
and the free trade arrangement may 
not be worth much if a more generous 
deal is subsequently made with the EU. 
The United Kingdom will not be able 
to provide those assurances until it has 
made a final deal with the EU.
The other more generic reason is that 
the bigger trade partner the harder 
it is to secure a trade deal. There are 
more constituencies which have to be 
negotiated and more has to be offered 
in return. Whilst deals with the likes of 
Singapore and New Zealand may appear 
relatively unproblematic, the United 
Kingdom has already begun to realise 
how challenging it will be to make a 
deal with India. There has also been 
some unrealistic assumptions about 
what the United Kingdom has to offer. 
There has, thus, been talk of creating 
a free trade area with the whole of 
Africa. In fact, the European Union has 
been trying to do this through three 
Economic Partnership Agreements. 
It has foundered because WTO rules 
require African States to grant wide-
ranging access to their markets for this 
to take place. Simple market access 
being provided by the EU is insufficient. 
With many nascent industries, they have 
been wary about this. This wariness is 
unlikely to change simply because the 
request is coming from Whitehall rather 
than Brussels.
So, yes it will be cold outside the 
European Union. Which is why the 
odds on a transitional deal will increase 
during the second half of 2018.
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